SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE AGE OF STRING THEORY by Dawid, Richard
11
SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN THE AGE OF
STRING THEORY
Richard Dawid
Institute for Philosophy and Institute Vienna Circle
University of Vienna,
Universtita¨tscampus 2-4, Hof 1, A-1090 Wien, Austria
Email: dawid@univie.ac.at
October 8, 2007
Abstract
String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a unified
description of all known natural forces. This article tries to demon-
strate that the fundamental structural and methodological differences
that set string theory apart from other physical theories have impor-
tant philosophical consequences. Focussing on implications for the
realism debate in philosophy of science, it is argued that both poles
of that debate face new problems in the context of string theory. On
the one hand, the claim of underdetermination of scientific theory by
the available empirical data, which is a pivotal element of empiricism,
loses much of its plausibility. On the other hand, the dissolution of any
meaningful notion of an external ontological object destroys the ba-
sis for conventional versions of scientific realism. String theory seems
to suggest an intermediate position akin to Structural Realism that
is based on a newly emerging principle, to be called the principle of
theoretical uniqueness.
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1 Introduction
In one respect, quantum mechanics resembles the music of Arnold Schoen-
berg: its restricted accessibility awards eternal youth. The conception that
was created 80 years ago to replace the failing laws of classical physics in the
microscopic world still looks fresh and exciting and remains the paragon of a
modern scientific theory. The unshakable status of the quantum principle as
the grand enigma at the base of modern physical inquiry has a peculiar conse-
quence however: it keeps the scientific and philosophical community beyond
a small group of experts strangely insensitive to the significance of the newer
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developments in fundamental physics. Hidden from the outsider behind an
impenetrable forest of mathematical formalism, the conceptual novelties of
those developments are usually taken as complex but minor addenda to the
epoch-making events of the quantum revolution. Though current physical
theories like gauge theory or quantum gravity1 are being analysed in philos-
ophy of physics, the general discourse in philosophy of science has remained
largely untouched by arguments from recent elementary high energy physics.
String theory in particular, which will be the subject of this article, plays
a leading role in contemporary high energy physics but so far has remained
fairly unknown territory even for specialised philosophy of physics.2
String theory is the most ambitious theory in fundamental physics to-
day. Replacing the point-like elementary particles of traditional high energy
physics by miniscule but extended objects, it presently constitutes the only
promising approach to provide a unified description of all known natural
forces. Despite a history of more than thirty years of string theoretical re-
search, however, string theory still remains an empirically unconfirmed and
theoretically incomplete theory. While it has been argued elsewhere [Daw06]
that a philosophical analysis of the structure and dynamics of string the-
oretical research can open up new perspectives on the evaluation of string
theory’s current scientific status, the present article will not directly discuss
the question of string theory’s viability. It will rather ask the conditional
question: if string theory were an empirically viable physical theory, what
would be its philosophical implications? Assessing the outcome of this dis-
cussion, one should bear in mind, however, that string physics represents
a natural continuation of the particle physics research program. It is in-
tricately entangled with other fields of particle physics model building and
shares many core concepts with well established and empirically well tested
theories in the field. Philosophical implications identified in the context of
string physics thus often can be understood as an intensification of trends
already perceptible in the context of empirically confirmed theories of high
energy physics.
The present work will focus on string theory’s potential consequences for a
pivotal debate in philosophy of science: the debate about scientific realism. It
will be argued that the scientific concepts and techniques that have emerged
1An instructive recent collection of articles on quantum gravity can be found in [CH01].
2Some of the rare examples of philosophical reflections on string theory are [Wei01],
[BI01], [Hed02] and [Hed07].
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during the last few decades in particle physics and found their most universal
realisation in string theory imply deep and unexpected changes in physics’
take on physical reality. If string theory is scientifically viable, they may
have philosophical consequences whose significance can well be compared
to the philosophical impact of quantum mechanics. Following a sketch of
string theory, a short introduction into the scientific realism debate will set
the scene for the main discussion. Sections 4 and 5 will present two different
kinds of arguments against empiricism which can be derived from high energy
physics and string theory in particular; Section 6 will then give a string-
based argument against scientific realism. Finally, an attempt will be made
to draw a consistent conclusion from the seemingly contradictory messages
which emerge when scientific realism meets strings.
2 String Theory
String theory3 was first suggested as a universal theory of microphysics in
1974.4 The approach had to struggle with big conceptual difficulties in the
beginning and was seen as an exotic fantasy until its breakthrough ten years
later, when some important consistency problems were finally resolved. Al-
though there still doesn’t exist any direct experimental evidence for string
theory, today it is acknowledged by a majority of high energy physicists as
the only promising candidate for the construction of a truly unified theory
of all natural forces.
The basic idea of string theory is to replace the point-like elementary
particles of traditional particle theories by one-dimensional strings in order
to provide a basis for the unification of quantum physics and gravity. The
core obstacle to an integration of gravity in the context of quantum field
theory is the occurrence of untreatable infinities in calculations of particle
interactions due to the possibility of point particles coming arbitrarily close
to each other.5 The extendedness of strings ‘smears out’ the contact point
3The topical standard work on string theory is [Pol98]. A classic earlier book is
[GSW87]. A more accessible presentation for the general physicist can be found in [Zwi04].
An instructive popular presentation for the non-physicist is [Gre99].
4The history of the concept of strings even goes back to the late 1960ies, when it was
discussed in a different context however.
5The reason why this problem is more dramatic in the presence of gravitation than in
a calculation of nuclear interactions has to do with the fact that the gravitational force
grows with increased energy density.
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between any two objects and thus provides a decisively improved framework
that seems to allow finite calculations6. String theory represents a natural
continuation of the high energy physics research program that has close ties
with other theories in high energy physics like supersymmetry, supergravity
or large extra dimensions. It requires mathematical methods beyond those of
traditional elementary particle physics, however, due to the highly complex
structure of one- or more-dimensional objects moving in higher-dimensional
backgrounds.
The seemingly innocent step from point-like objects to strings implies
an amazing host of complex structural consequences. A string theory able
to describe matter can only be consistently formulated in 10 space-time di-
mensions (respectively 11 space-time dimensions in one specific formulation).
This prediction marks the first time in the history of physics that the num-
ber of spatial dimensions can be derived from a physical theory. The obvious
fact that only 4 space-time dimensions are macroscopically visible is taken
into account by the assumption that 6 dimensions are ‘compactified’. They
have the topological shape of a cylinder surface where, after some translation
in the ‘compactified’ direction, one ends up again at the point of departure.
The compactification radius as well as the string length are assumed to be
so small that both the extension of the string and the additional dimensions
are invisible to the current particle experiments. Both scales are expected to
lie close to the Planck length, the characteristic length scale of gravity where
the gravitational force becomes comparably strong to the nuclear forces. Ac-
cording to conventional wisdom, the Planck scale lies so far beyond the reach
of particle experiments that there is no hope ever to observe strings with
the established methods of particle experiment.7 It turns out that the posit
of one-dimensional elementary objects implies the additional introduction of
even higher dimensional objects like two dimensional membranes or, to put
it generally, d-dimensional so called d-branes.
In conventional quantum physics, elementary particles carry quantum
numbers which determine their behaviour. A particle’s characteristics like
6Though the finiteness of string theory is not proven conclusively, it is supported by
fairly strong evidence.
7There do exist theoretical scenarios of large or “warped” extra dimensions where the
extremely high four-dimensional Planck scale we know is understood as an artefact of
extra dimensions which ‘hide’ a fundamental Planck scale that lies much closer to the
observable regime. Thus it is not entirely excluded that strings will some not too distant
day become observable after all.
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spin or charge, which are expressed by quantum numbers, constitute intrin-
sic and irreducible properties. Strings do not have quantum numbers but
can differ from each other by their topological shape and their dynamics:
Strings can be open, meaning that they have two endpoints, or closed like
a rubber band. If they are closed, they can be wrapped around the various
compactified dimensions in different ways. Both, open and closed strings can
assume different oscillation modes. These characteristics define the macro-
scopic appearance of the string. To the observer who does not have sufficient
resolution to perceive the stringy structure, a string in a specific oscillation
mode and topological position looks like a point-like particle with certain
quantum numbers. A change of, let’s say, its oscillation mode would be per-
ceived as a transmutation into a different particle. Strings at a fundamental
level do not have coupling constants either. The strength of their interaction
with each other again can be reduced to some aspect of their dynamics. (The
ground state of a certain mode of the string expansion, the dilaton, gives the
string coupling constant.) All characteristic numbers of a quantum field the-
ory are thus being dissolved into geometry and dynamics of an oscillating
string.
String theories which are able to describe matter fields have to be su-
persymmetric, i. e. they must be invariant under specific transformations
between particles of different spin. Models which have this property are
called ‘superstring’ models. It turns out that superstrings automatically in-
clude gravitation and thus represent a natural candidate for a unification of
gravity and microphysics.
One very important feature of string theory remains to be mentioned. The
string world shows a remarkable tendency to link seemingly quite different
string scenarios by so-called duality relations. Two dual theories are exactly
equivalent with respect to their observational consequences, though they are
quite differently constructed and may involve different types of elementary
objects and different topological scenarios. The phenomenon can be best
introduced by an example. As it was mentioned above, closed strings can be
wrapped around compactified dimensions. On the other hand, strings can
also just move along a compactified dimension. Due to basic principles of
quantum mechanics momenta in closed dimensions can only assume certain
discrete ‘quantised’ levels. Thus there exist two basic discrete numbers which
characterise the state of a closed string in a compactified dimension: The
number of times the string is wrapped around this dimension and the number
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of its momentum state in that very same dimension.8 One of the duality
relations of string theory, T-duality, implies that a model where a string
with characteristic length9 l is wrapped n times around a dimension with
radius R and has momentum level m is dual to a model where a string is
wrapped m times around a dimension with radius l2/R and has momentum
level n. The two descriptions give identical physics. The key precondition
for this remarkable phenomenon is the quantum uncertainty that provides
the ‘fuzziness’ necessary for such unlikely identification. It is only in string
theory, however, that dualities become a characteristic feature of physical
theories. A little more about dualities will be said in chapter 6 where this
concept will assume an important role in the philosophical argument.
3 Scientific Realism versus Empiricism
The scientific realism debate, which shall be confronted with string physics
in the following, descends from the age-old problem of the relation between
observation and theory. While pre-modern philosophy generally tended to
rank the place-value of theoretical reasoning higher than profane observation,
the success of the scientific method with its strong emphasis on experimen-
tal confirmation inverted that hierarchy. Observation became the ultimate
judge over the justification of theoretical statements.10 Provided that state-
ments must have an observational implication to be meaningful, the question
arises whether theoretical statements can constitute knowledge about any-
thing beyond observational data at all. Scientific anti-realists deny this while
scientific realists want to retain at least some trace of the ‘golden age’ of the-
oretical autarky. In the context of modern scientific theories, the question
circles around the status of theoretical concepts which do not refer to directly
observable objects. The scientific realist awards to the electron and the quark
the same ontological status as to chairs and tables. Her antirealist opponent
asserts that the concepts of unobservable objects are of importance merely
as technical tools to describe and predict visible phenomena. Two classical
antirealist positions can be distinguished. The instrumentalist flatly denies
8The two numbers are called winding number respectively Kaluza-Klein level.
9The characteristic string length denotes its length when no energy is being invested
to stretch it.
10Excluded are solely mathematical statements, which are usually understood as mean-
ingful but a priori.
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that statements about unobservable theoretical objects can be literally true.
Bas van Fraassen11 pointed out, however, that there is a less radical way of
rejecting scientific realism. His constructive empiricism acknowledges that
statements about theoretical objects can be literally true in principle but
claims that it is impossible to collect sufficient evidence for the truth of any
particular statement. Shunning the ontological quality of the instrumentalist
assertion, constructive empiricism remains on an epistemological level.
During the long history of the scientific realism debate, realists as well as
empiricists have produced a complex web of interrelated objections against
their respective opponents. The core of the dispute may be represented by
the non-realist’s pessimistic meta-induction12 and the realist’s no miracles
argument13. According to the pessimistic meta-induction, the history of sci-
ence shows that new empirical or theoretical developments have often led to
the replacement of formerly successful theories by new concepts with a signifi-
cantly different ontology. Since there is no reason to assume that this pattern
will terminate today, it is implausible to hold that the present theories are
approximately true or contain scientific objects which refer to anything in the
outside world. The no miracles argument, on the other hand, asserts that the
conspicuous ability of scientific theories to predict new phenomena correctly
would be a miracle if the theories in question were not approximately true
and did not contain scientific objects which referred to something in the out-
side world. Further arguments on both sides enhance the impression of an
uncomfortable impasse: anti-realists doubt the validity of the realist strategy
to explain scientific predictive success and question whether realists can even
give a satisfactory definition of what makes a scientific object ‘real’; realists
point out that the anti-realist does not offer a satisfactory way of delimiting
observable from unobservable objects and ignores the striking realist conno-
tations of the technical treatment of well understood unobservable objects.
The plausibility of the realist’s assertion that anti-realism misses something
important about science stands against the antirealist’s convincing claim that
the conventional forms of realism are not satisfactory. We will leave aside for
now a discussion of attempts in philosophy of science to find some middle
ground between realism and empiricism, and approach the problem from a
different angle. It shall be analysed to what extent contemporary high en-
11[vF80].
12The seminal version of the argument was given in [Lau81].
13See e. g. [Put75] and [Boy96].
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ergy physics, and in particular string theory, might contribute to an altered
understanding of the question of realism.
4 Theoretical Complexity against Empiricism
The recent evolution of fundamental physics may be understood to carry one
message for the realism debate that can be appreciated without going into
the details of new physical conceptions: empiricism is most plausible in the
context of moderately developed theory. The higher developed the theoretical
apparatus gets, the more difficult it becomes to retain any plausibility of the
assertion that its subject must not be anything but observation.
At least two reasons for this claim may be stated. First, the ascent of
theory can open new frontiers of the visible whose identification with fron-
tiers of existence appears less plausible than in the classical cases. A good
example can be found in modern cosmology. Most versions of instrumental-
ism uphold the claim that statements about the past can have a truth value.
Now modern cosmology tells us that the early highly dense stages of our
universe represent a world void of all macroscopic objects and remote from
all classical physical conditions as we know them. The early universe thus
is just as adverse to direct visibility as microphysical processes today. The
instrumentalist therefore is forced to deny ‘real existence’ to all objects in the
early universe and, if staying on course, would consequently have to insert
her own ‘ontological big bang’ to denote the point in time when the real world
as she accepts it start to exist. Everything before this point would just be
a mathematical construction to structure the later evolution. Things would
start their existence ‘out of nothing’ just because any earlier evolution could
not satisfy the visibility condition. This partition of a physically continuous
causal process by an arbitrary ontological distinction looks quite unconvinc-
ing. It is particularly awkward since the ontological posit must rely entirely
on abstract physical arguments about the physical conditions of the universe
at a stage that was void of and adverse to any form of intelligent life. The
argument thus lacks any connection with actual human observation, which
clearly runs counter to the initial motivation of instrumentalism to emphasise
the special status of actual human observation in contrast to abstract theory
building. Constructive empiricism is less affected by this problem because its
epistemological limits can be placed on the time axis with less argumentative
effort.
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The second point equally affects instrumentalism and constructive em-
piricism: once the balance between theoretical effort and observational con-
sequence gets strongly tilted towards theory, it becomes quite problematic
to hold that the theoretical physicist’s sound motivations for her activity
exclusively lie in the visible regime. A comparison of the situation at the
heyday of quantum mechanics with the situation today shows the problem:
The observable consequences of quantum mechanics are enormous, culminat-
ing in the explosions of atomic bombs which are impossible to overlook even
for the staunchest sceptic of theoretical physics. In that context, the micro-
scopic structuring done by theoretical quantum physicists for all its complex-
ity might still be understood as a reasonable technical effort to produce and
predict its stunning observable effects. In modern high energy physics, on the
other hand, the characteristic phenomenological implications of theories like
the particle physics Standard Model or supersymmetry look marginal if taken
out of their theoretical context. Often they are limited to a few unusual lines
on a set of photos taken in a collider experiment. It requires a multi billion
dollar build-up of huge particle colliders and the sustained work of thou-
sands of experimentalists to see these lines at all. To explain them, equally
large numbers of theoretical physicists devote all their time and energy and
feel compelled to develop theories of unprecedented complexity. The claim
that the development of modern high energy physics’ elaborate theories can-
not be justified by the quest for truth about the micro-world but solely by
these theories’ technical ability to structure and predict some miniscule lines
in Geneva or Chicago14 simply would amount to declaring the high energy
physics community a bunch of insane and money-wasting crackpots. Most
philosophers of science nowadays would agree that any insinuation in this
direction oversteps the authority of philosophy of science.15 But to concede
that the enterprise of high energy physics is justified means to accept justi-
fication from somewhere within the theoretical body of its theories, beyond
the dry and minimalist phenomenological surface. It means to accept that
we spend money and time to acquire knowledge about quarks, gauge bosons,
14The two locations where the collider experiments at highest energies take place these
days.
15Past unfortunate excursions of natural philosophy into the realm of scientific prediction
have laid the ground for the widespread conviction that philosophy of science should solely
interpret the scientific process and abstain from censoring it. There do exist philosophers
of science, however, who, feel confident to give advice to scientific goal definition from a
philosophical perspective. (see e.g. [Car99])
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the hot early universe or the big bang and not just about the weird pattern
of lines on a photo. In order to acquire knowledge of the latter kind, we must
be confident that at least some of the statements contained in the theories
in question are approximately true in a literal sense. To adopt this attitude,
however, bluntly contradicts the core claims of both instrumentalism and
constructive empiricism.
String theory constitutes a further step towards a conception of scientific
activity that is at variance with an empiricist stance. It is unclear when -
if at all - there will be an experiment that can test string theory directly
and how that experiment would look like. The focus of string theoretical
interest today therefore must lie on the theoretical structures developed. If
string theorists claim - as many of them do - that they gain new insights
into nature by developing their theory, they can only refer to (potential)
knowledge about theoretical objects or structures and not to knowledge about
visible phenomena.
5 Scientific Underdetermination
5.1 A Disparity of Views
String theory creates serious problems for empiricism at an entirely different
level as well. A look at string theory’s current status shall set the stage for
the discussion of this point. A peculiar disparity of views has been noticeable
since the rise of the theory in the mid 1980s and has recently developed into
a sometimes vitriolic dispute between exponents and opponents of the string
theoretical research program. String physicists themselves have the at times
euphoric feeling to work on a pivotal and historic step towards a fuller un-
derstanding of the world. String theory’s lack of experimental corroboration
and its sadly incomplete state, to be sure, are generally acknowledged as
deplorable weak points. Nevertheless, except for a minority who see them-
selves as mere mathematicians, string theorists are convinced to have reached
deeper insight into the structure of physical matter than anyone before. This
understanding is shared in a slightly more cautious way by many exponents
of adjacent fields like particle physics model building or cosmology. The
majority of physicists in other fields, from phenomenological high energy
physics over canonical quantum gravity to applied physics, as well as most
philosophers of science, have a substantially more critical perspective on the
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status of string theory. It is their understanding that, considering the lack of
empirical confirmation, string theory has never left the phase of pure spec-
ulation. After more than thirty years of intense work on the subject that
has neither produced any testable prediction nor even anything close to a
complete theory, outspoken critics of the string theoretical research program
recommend to focus on the search for alternatives rather than stick for ever
to an enormously demanding but potentially futile enterprise. Despite the
sometimes polemic wording, the disagreement between the two sides is not of
a fundamentalist nature. String theorists do not dare to be absolutely sure
about the existence of strings and their critics concede that they might turn
out to be on the right track after all, if an experimental test can be found.
Still the degree of mutual alienation is quite significant.
The described disparity of views about the validity of a new theory has
characteristics of a paradigm change a` la Kuhn16. The rift goes deeper,
however, than in standard cases of paradigm change in science. In the eyes of
the critics of string theory, a theory without experimental backing, whatever
the details, cannot be called a well established theory. Exaggerated trust
in that theory thus leaves the path of sober natural science. For the string
theorist, to the contrary, her trust in the theory is based on a careful scientific
analysis of the theory’s theoretical merits and its contextual embedding. The
fundamental disagreement about the value of string theory therefore is not a
matter of physical detail, it is a matter of defining the authority and power
of purely theoretical reasoning within the scientific process. If one wants to
use the word ‘paradigm’ as a technical term solely applicable to perspectives
within a scientific field, one might call the rift between string theorists and
phenomenologists a meta-paradigmatic rift. The two sides do not agree on
the definition of science.
Similar situations have occurred before. A prominent example is the
opposition of empiricist physicists like Ernst Mach to the posit of invisible
scientific objects like atoms in physics at the turn of the 19th century. Their
understanding of science was so closely bound to the principle of direct obser-
vation that they considered talk about invisible objects unscientific.17 The
16[Kuh62].
17An important difference between the earlier reservations against the status of invisible
scientific objects and the present ones against the relevance of string theory should be em-
phasised: Contrary to the latter, the Machian arguments were not based on the consensual
position of the traditional scientific community. They rather construed an artificial notion
of an ideal scientific attitude which itself constituted a new position and had never been
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dispute receded from the physical regime in the 20th century, when it be-
came generally accepted scientific standard to argue on the basis of invisible
structures, but continued on a philosophical interpretational level, where it
constitutes the core motive of instrumentalism and constructive empiricism.
The different points of view on string theory can be understood as a
sequel of the old empiricist dispute. The string theorists’ self-confidence
without empirical backing once again infringes on the dominance of observa-
tion in science and seems to suggest a more dramatic shift of the scientific
paradigm than in the case of the acceptance of invisible scientific objects.
The latter changed the meaning of ‘observable’ by acknowledging the option
to measure observables indirectly, but it kept the experimental primacy fully
intact. String theorists, though still subscribing to experiment’s position as
the ultimate judge over scientific theory, in fact seem to diminish its role
by assuming that scientists can develop a considerable degree of confidence
in the viability of scientific statements on a purely theoretical basis. In a
nutshell, they claim: experiment is important if we can carry it out, but if
we can not, scientific progress can proceed without it.
What drives string theorists towards this significant shift in their con-
ception of science? When physics fully endorsed scientific objects like atoms
at the beginning of the 20th century, scientific progress inevitably enforced
this step as many newly discovered phenomena just did not find any other
satisfactory explanation. Does contemporary high energy physics offer an
equally forceful argument for string theory’s apparent theoretical autarky?
5.2 Scientific Underdetermination
The following attempt to answer above’s question will crucially rely on the
concept of underdetermination of scientific theory building by the avail-
able data (henceforth to be called scientific underdetermination, following
[Daw06]). Scientific underdetermination must be clearly distinguished from
two more prominent forms of underdetermination. On the one hand, it must
be delimited from Quinean underdetermination as formulated in [Qui70],
which asserts the existence of scientific theories that are empirically equiv-
alent with respect to all possible empirical data. Scientific underdetermina-
tion, to the contrary, asserts the existence of several or many theories which
fit the presently available data but may differ in their predictions with respect
fully reflected in the scientist’s perspective.
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to future data. On the other hand, scientific underdetermination differs from
Humean underdetermination by taking for granted certain pre-assumptions
and pre-conditions of scientific theory building. While Hume points out the
logical impossibility of deducing any future phenomenology from past ob-
servations, science relies on the inductive inference from observed regularity
patterns to predictions of future events. Furthermore, satisfactory scientific
theories are expected to satisfy a number of general conditions like a certain
degree of universality or the avoidance of ad-hoc posits which account for
individual events. Scientific underdetermination is realised only if several
or many theories which satisfy the stated conditions and therefore qualify
as serious scientific contenders can be built in accordance with the available
empirical data. Whether or not scientific underdetermination is considered
a characteristic of the scientific process at a certain stage thus does not have
any implications for the more elementary problem of induction.
In the following discussion of scientific underdetermination, we will dis-
regard empirically equivalent theories and focus on theories which, while all
in agreement with the presently available data, can be distinguished by fu-
ture experiments. The term ‘scientific underdetermination’ thus will be used
synonymously with the notion of ‘transient underdetermination’ introduced
by [Skl75] and discussed e.g. by [Sta01].18
It is generally assumed that scientific theory building is underdetermined
by the available empirical data. If scientific theory building were not sci-
entifically underdetermined, scientific progress would have to be exclusively
accumulative. The replacement of temporarily successful theories by con-
ceptually different successors would be excluded since any such replacement
would imply that at least two theories, the old and the new one, were com-
patible with the available empirical data at the time when the old theory was
valid. History of science shows, however, that scientific progress in the past
was by no means purely accumulative. The scientific underdetermination of
contemporary scientific theories can then be inferred from the historic exam-
18We do not use the term ‘transient’ in the present article since it would be a little
misleading in our context. Transient underdetermination is transient only with respect
to a specific set of empirically distinguishable theories. The classical understanding of
scientific progress as a never ending sequence of empirically motivated theory changes
implies, however, that the underdetermination of theory building by the available data is
not transient in a wider sense: there is no finite program of empirical testing that would
remove it.
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ples of theory replacement based on the pessimistic meta-induction cited in
Section 3.
The importance of scientific underdetermination is not confined to in-
stances of theory replacement. In many scientific fields it seems clear that
large numbers of theories could be constructed which would be compatible
with the currently available data but would make predictions of future phe-
nomena which just do not agree with nature. Any such diversity of theoretical
options exemplifies scientific underdetermination.
Still, it seems clear that entirely unrestrained scientific underdetermina-
tion does not accord with the observed characteristics of scientific research.
Natural science shows a distinctive tendency of favouring one specific funda-
mental theory about a certain subject at each stage of its evolution. This fact
delimits natural science from other fields like history or social sciences and
is at variance with an indiscriminate postulate of scientific underdetermina-
tion. In addition, as already referred to in Section 2, the very same history of
science that delivers uncounted examples of fundamental theory change also
knows of many instances where theories successfully predicted entirely new
phenomena. If there existed an unlimited number of equally promising al-
ternative scientific theories which fit any given set of physical data but make
different empirical predictions with respect to future experiments, it would
be unclear how scientists could manage to pick the correct theory so often.
(see e.g. [Daw07]) The predictive success of science, which, as noted in Sec-
tion 3, is deployed against anti-realist positions by the no-miracles argument,
therefore also indicates the existence of limitations to underdetermination.
The degree of scientific underdetermination thus emerges as a highly non-
trivial characteristic of the scientific process; a characteristic that will be
crucial for the present discussion for one reason: it largely determines the
status of empirically unconfirmed scientific theory building. To a hypothet-
ical scientist who denies scientific underdetermination, the viability of em-
pirical predictions which stem from a coherent theoretical description of the
available data would seem just as reliable as the assumption that a viable
scientific description of the given phenomena exists at all. Given that scien-
tific underdetermination seems to be a matter of fact, though, its suspected
limitations may still justify a certain degree of confidence with respect to an
empirically unconfirmed theory’s validity. Totally unlimited scientific under-
determination, finally, would destroy all hope of choosing the right theory
without direct empirical guidance.
At this point, string physics enters the stage. While science knows in-
16
stances where purely theoretical arguments have instilled some degree of
confidence in empirically unconfirmed theoretical schemes, the principle of
scientific underdetermination has been considered sufficiently strong to pre-
vent the full endorsement of those theories. The primate of empirical con-
firmation has always remained uncontested. String physics may be the first
example where the theory’s appraisal by its exponents may be taken to sug-
gest otherwise. It thus may be suspected that, in the eyes of its exponents,
string theory provides reasons for assuming unusually strong limitations to
scientific underdetermination which justify a higher emphasis on theoretical
arguments for evaluating the viability of scientific statements. This under-
standing would offer a plausible explanation for the striking antagonism be-
tween string theorists and the theory’s external critics: while string physicists
themselves feel impressed by the new kinds of indications of strong limitations
to underdetermination which they encounter in their daily work, physicists
who don’t share that experience or feel particularly fond of the traditional
scientific paradigm cannot understand the string physicists’ disregard for the
traditional and well established principles of theory appraisal.
5.3 Limitations to Scientific Underdetermination
in String Theory
[Daw06] offers arguments for the claim that strong indications of new limita-
tions to scientific underdetermination can indeed be found in string theory.
Since these arguments will play an essential role in the later analysis, they
shall be sketched in the present subsection. The reader who looks for a
thorough argumentation, however, should resort to [Daw06].
Arguments in favour of limitations to scientific underdetermination emerge
at two different levels. The first kind of reasoning is based on general char-
acteristics of the research process that leads towards string theory.
Maybe the most conspicuous argument in the eyes of string physicists
is the ‘argument of no choice’. String physicists claim that, after intense
investigations in various directions, their approach has remained the only
viable approach leading towards a unified theory of gravity and nuclear in-
teractions that has been even remotely successful. Loop-quantum gravity
and other approaches in canonical quantum gravity from that perspective
can not count as alternatives because they only discuss the reconciliation of
gravity with basic principles of quantum physics without offering strategies
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to include a full theoretical description of nuclear interactions. With respect
to fully unified theories, string physicists offer some qualitative arguments
to demonstrate that very different points of departure which seem to have
nothing to do with string physics, after more careful examination turn out
to lead back towards string theory (see e.g. [Pol99] ).
The significance of these statements is taken to be supported by past
experience in particle physics: if physicists knock on many doors to solve a
conceptual problem and exactly one opens that in turn leads towards rich and
coherent new structure, chances apparently are good that this solution will
turn out to be empirically viable. The most impressive witness to this claim
is the standard model of particle physics. Crucial elements of the standard
model like the gauge structure of interactions have been suggested without
immediate empirical evidence based on purely theoretical argumentation in
order to solve theoretical consistency problems. Eventually, the deployment
of these concepts has been confirmed by experiment and has led to a large
number of empirically viable predictions. String physicists argue that alter-
natives have been checked more carefully in the case of string physics than it
had been at the time of the development of the standard model, which may
instil a certain amount of trust in the viability of string theory’s conceptual
claims.
An additional argument is based on surprising instances of conceptual
coherence in the context of string theory. It is generally accepted that a
scientific theory is convincingly confirmed by empirical data that did not
influence the construction of the theory but is correctly predicted by it. In
a similar way, a theory may be corroborated on purely theoretical grounds.
It may provide improvements of the theoretical understanding of intercon-
nections between different physical phenomena even though the construction
principles applied when creating the theory did not aim at that kind of im-
provement. String physicists argue that such theoretical confirmation should
be taken seriously as a basis for judging a theory’s viability. String physics
offers a number of surprising instances of conceptual coherence. Three of the
most important ones are the fact that a theory of quantized extended objects
implies gravity, the fact that a string theory of matter requires supersymme-
try (which joins two important directions of particle physics research) and
the fact that string theory in certain special cases can explain the connection
between black hole entropy and the black hole event horizon.
Each one of the three presented reasons for string theorists’ self confi-
dence can be interpreted in terms of a devaluation of the scientific under-
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determination principle. The argument of no choice directly suggests that
the existence of alternative scientifically satisfactory theories is a less natural
assumption in the case of string theory than in prior physical contexts. The
empirical success of the particle physics research program as well as string
theory’s tendency to create unexpected internal coherence may be taken as
indirect signs of significant limitations to scientific underdetermination since
unlimited underdetermination would render the occurrence of both unlikely.
While the three arguments presented up to this point have precursors in
earlier scientific theory building and may be understood in terms of (pre-
liminary) highpoints of longstanding developments, string theory also offers
genuinely new arguments which hint in the same direction at a different level:
the theoretical structure of string physics itself seems to suggest a devaluation
of scientific underdetermination.
Of crucial importance in this context are two related properties of string
theory. Unlike all other known physical theories, string theory at a funda-
mental level does not have any free parameters. Neither does it have any
dimensionless parameters which can be freely adjusted to fit empirical data
nor does it have any dimensionful parameters whose values can be tuned with
respect to characteristic parameters of a relevant measuring apparatus.19 Be-
yond that point, based on some very basic assumptions like the existence of
matter and of more than one spatial dimension, string theory shows an even
higher degree of uniqueness. Due to the phenomenon of string duality, which
will be addressed in Section 6, there seems to remain no freedom of con-
structing different types of string theory at a fundamental level. Rather,
there seems to be only one way to construct the fundamental structure of
string theory. The lack of structural freedom of choice together with the lack
of free parameters shall be called the ‘structural uniqueness’ of string theory.
It is not clear at this point in how far string theory’s structural unique-
ness translates into one inevitable set of parameter values of low energy
theories like the Standard Model. From a string theoretical perspective, the
Standard Model parameters are effective parameters which are uniquely de-
termined by string theoretical features like the value of the string coupling
constant, the radii of the compactified dimensions or the number of D-branes.
These stringy features again must be understood as the result of a dynamical
process that is based on the fundamental equations of string theory (which,
19The latter fact is due to the theory’s universal character which necessarily also covers
the physics that describes the experimental apparatus.
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as described, do not have any free parameters) and leads from the big bang
towards some ground state of the theory. If string theory would have one the-
oretically enforced energetic ground state where all those values are uniquely
determined, that would uniquely determine the low energy parameter values
as well. According to the present understanding, however, there seem to exist
huge numbers of theoretically coherent stable or meta-stable20 ground states
in string theory, which could all be reached in the early quantum processes of
our universe21. While an as yet unknown vacuum selection mechanism that
singles out one or a reasonably small number of specific energetic minima
may emerge trough a better understanding or substantial reshaping of string
physics, its existence appears questionable at this point. The alternative
would be a scenario where the selection from a huge number of physically
allowed local ground states would depend on the accidental outcome of quan-
tum fluctuations at the initial stages of our universe.22 As different ground
states correspond to different parameter values of the effective theories at low
energies, that scenario could dramatically reduce string theory’s predictive
power. (See e.g. [Dou03] and [Sus07].)
Though the question of string theory’s predictive power thus remains a
matter of speculation, it is important to notice that both ends of the spec-
trum of possible answers suggest a fundamentally altered understanding of
scientific underdetermination. If the predictive power of string physics were
indeed dramatically reduced by the irreducibly statistical nature of quantum
physics, this would significantly alter the perspectives for further physical
inquiry. Since it would be difficult to understand how quantitative aspects
which are a matter of quantum statistics in one scheme should be calculable in
another, one might suspect a fundamental block to scientific progress, which
clearly would change the understanding of theory succession and presumably
should have an impact on the related question of scientific underdetermina-
20If there exist several local minima of the potential at different energy levels, it can
be expected that the lower minimum will eventually be reached by quantum tunnelling.
However, depending on the size of the potential barrier and the energy difference between
the ground states, the time until such quantum tunnelling can be statistically expected
to occur may be huge, even greater than the present age of the universe. Thus, we might
live such a meta-stable state of the universe.
21This of course applies to the canonical understanding of quantum physics. Deter-
ministic hidden parameter theories would have to determine one unique path towards a
predetermined ground state.
22Conceptions dealing with eternal inflation and multiverse models embed the universe
we inhabit in a grander background scheme.
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tion as well. No more specific analysis of that point shall be attempted here,
however.
If, on the other hand, some as yet unknown vacuum selection mecha-
nism reduces the number of physically allowed ground states to an extent
that makes string theory highly predictive23, an even more far-reaching ar-
gument could be applied. In short, a highly predictive structurally unique
theory changes the basis for assessing the plausibility of scientifically viable
alternatives. Since (i) structurally unique theories appear to be much more
rare than conventional ones and (ii), if highly predictive, they cover a far
smaller part of the parameter space of imaginable observable characteristic
numbers, the traditional assessments of scientific underdetermination do not
apply any more. It is quite implausible to expect that alternative highly
predictive structurally unique theories exist which can to some accuracy re-
produce the parameter values of a given theory of that kind. If a highly
predictive structurally unique theory would turn out to be empirically viable
to a certain degree of accuracy (under a certain set of empirical data), one
thus should be led to presume that this theory cannot be replaced by another
theory that fulfils the condition of highly predictive structural uniqueness.
A replacement by a new theory that does not meet that condition would be
implausible as well, since the highly predictive structural uniqueness of its
predecessor would then appear like a miracle. Together, the two statements
suggest that such a theory would have to be expected to be a final theory
that will not be replaced any more by any empirically different alternative
at all.
Interestingly, similar final theory claims occur in the context of string
theory at other levels as well. String theory is the first physical theory that
seriously claims to provide a full conceptual unification of all known elemen-
tary physical phenomena, which makes it the first final theory candidate if
full conceptual unification is taken to be a scientific goal. A more powerful
final theory claim is related to an interesting implication of string dualities
(See e.g. [Wit01]). T-duality, which has been briefly described in section 2,
implies an absolute minimum length in the sense that all empirical tests of
distance scales smaller than the critical scale can, based on duality relations,
be understood as tests of distance scales larger than the critical scale. An
23‘Highly predictive’ here means roughly that the number of physically possible ground
states of the theory is lower than the number of possible values of some observable that
can, within reasonable boundaries, be distinguished by a precision measurement.
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absolute limit is set on attaining new physical information below a certain
scale and so formally puts an end to the continuous physical search for new
phenomena at ever smaller distance scales.
While none of the presented arguments in itself constitutes a disproof of
the principle of scientific underdetermination, the remarkable multitude of
different arguments which point in the same direction justifies the claim that
a substantial devaluation of the principle of scientific underdetermination
in the context of string physics seems plausible. Of course, this statement
only acquires significance if string physics turns out to be a viable physical
conception. If that were the case, however, there are many reasons to suspect
that it will not any more be superseded by a successor theory. It should
be emphasised that this claim does not come up to an announcement of
an imminent end of fundamental physical research. The history of string
theoretical research suggests that a completion of the theory may be just
as elusive a goal as a final theory had seemed to be at earlier stages of the
scientific evolution.
5.4 Theoretical Uniqueness
In the light of the previous subsection, string theory suggests a radically
altered assessment of the old antagonism between underdetermination and
theoretical prediction. The significance of this shift may be understood by
reconsidering the impasse between realism and empiricism sketched in chap-
ter 2. The uneasiness of the status quo was due to the significant elements
of successful prediction in science which seemed to favour realism while the
equally undeniable elements of underdetermination seemed to support em-
piricism. The same kind of unsatisfactory balance characterises all classical
philosophical attempts to undermine the status of underdetermination. A
nice example are the discussions around ‘deduction from the phenomena’,
which have drawn some attention in recent years.24 Newton claimed that his
physical theories were nothing but deductions from the phenomena. Norton
and some others set out a few years ago to justify Newton’s claim and went
on to stress the seemingly unique way physical theories are often enforced
by experimental data. Norton, for example, re-emphasised how quantisation
was forced upon physics by experiment. The argument of deduction from
the phenomena indeed seems to demonstrate that the case for underdetermi-
24See e. g. [Nor93], [Nor94] and [Wor00].
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nation is not as straightforward as some empiricists might want to believe.
However, this judgement does not come up to a full-scale refutation of un-
derdetermination. As it was emphasised in [Wor00], deductions from the
phenomena are always based on a certain conceptual framework that implic-
itly constitutes part of the theoretical scheme. The ‘deductive’ character of
a theory’s creation thus cannot prevent this theory from being superseded
by a new one once its conceptive foundations have been revised. To give a
prominent example, Newton ‘deduced’ the laws of gravitation based on the
concept of flat space and general relativity rejected that point of departure.
Deduction from the phenomena shows that there is a considerable element of
uniqueness in the evolution of physical theory building but it cannot refute
the pessimistic meta-induction. It therefore merely sharpens the impasse
between the realist and the empiricist side.
In the case of string theory, the situation is very different. Two levels
of discussion can be distinguished, which provide two different strategies of
dealing with the problem of the pessimistic meta-induction. First, there is the
actual status quo of string theoretical research. String theory today is highly
incomplete and in some respects looks more like a theoretical guideline to-
wards future developments than a fully fledged theory. The core claim of the
pessimistic meta-induction remains intact since string theoretical scientific
concepts today are surely no less preliminary than the scientific concepts
in previous periods of science. The posit of scientific underdetermination,
however, cannot profit from this fact any more. In the traditional picture,
the scientific evolution was taken to be carried by a sequence of fully con-
sistent theories. Each of these theories correctly described a limited data
set and some day became or was expected to become obsolete due to new
significantly contradictive data.25 The pessimistic meta-induction directly
implied scientific underdetermination since each new theory had to be at
least as convincingly compatible with the old data as its predecessor. In
string theory, the traditional picture is no more applicable. The theoretical
scheme at each stage of physical progress must be understood to be prelim-
inary because it is theoretically insufficient and incomplete. Progress may
be expected to arise based on a more far-reaching understanding of the the-
ory under investigation rather than on theory replacement. The theoretical
work on a deeper understanding and a fuller and more coherent formulation
25Naturally, that was always just an idealisation of the actual process, but at least it
seemed fairly close to what was actually happening.
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of string theory establishes purely theoretical progress as an equivalent and
independent second path towards physical knowledge besides experimental
progress.26
Far beyond the present state of the art lies the projected ideal of the
fully consistent string theory. Some characteristics of this ‘final’ theory like
its lack of free parameters or the fundamental lower limit to physical length
scales can be confidently predicted already today. Following the arguments
of Section 5.3, this knowledge may be taken to justify the assertion that a
fully developed string theory breaks the pessimistic meta-induction. If a full
formulation of a consistent string theory could be found one day, one should
expect that this theory is related to the observable world in one of two ways.
Either it turns out to be a dead end without any relation to the physical
world at all, or it constitutes a final theory in the sense that it describes all
possible experimental data based on a set of foundational principles without
any adjustable fundamental parameters. In both cases, the fully consistent
string theory can not be considered a viable but refutable intermediate step
in the evolution of science in the sense of the pessimistic meta-induction.
The emerging scenario overcomes the traditional impasse between under-
determination and theoretical prediction by denying to underdetermination
the status of an ‘eternal’ characteristic of all scientific theories. The under-
determination of traditional physical theories by experiment appears as an
historic feature of a period of fundamental physics that has not yet reached
the level of theoretical interconnectivity necessary to feel the full force of in-
ternal consistency arguments. Already at these earlier stages of the scientific
process, the predictive power of scientific theories provides an indication that
scientific underdetermination is not entirely limitless. The increasing lopsid-
edness towards theory and the impressive range of empirical confirmations
associated with high energy physics since the 1970s can be read as suggesting
significant limitations to scientific underdetermination with particular force.
String theory or what it will have become after completion, finally might
terminate the rule of scientific underdetermination.
At this point, a crucial question arises: if scientific underdetermination
looses its eminent position in the face of string physics, what can be said
about the paradigm that replaces it? Let us once again recall the three
messages from string physics which undermine the old picture of scientifically
underdetermined theory dynamics.
26As we have seen, it is currently the only path open to the physicist.
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• Characteristics of theory development and internal coherence bolster
the notion of strict limitations to underdetermination that was already
inherited from standard model physics.
• Arguments at various levels support the suspicion that string theory
might be a final theory.
• Unlike all previous physical theories, string theory is structurally unique
at a fundamental level.
The three messages jointly lay the foundation for the introduction of a
principle I want to call
The Principle of Theoretical Uniqueness : at a certain stage of scientific in-
quiry, a general set of empirical data together with general preconceptions
about the necessary conditions a theory must fulfil for being considered sci-
entific don’t leave freedom anymore for choosing theoretical concepts, struc-
tural details or fundamental parameter values. There is exactly one scientific
theory (modulo empirically equivalent alternative formulations, maybe) that
fits the empirical data. As it seems, the data does not even have to be very
specific but merely has to establish some elementary qualitative statements
about the character of the physical world.
While the basic principle of theoretical uniqueness finds considerable sup-
port by our current knowledge about string physics, the principle’s strength
remains an open question even under the assumption that string theory is a
valid theory about nature. In order to discuss the range of possibilities, we
shall distinguish three different specifications of the term ‘theoretical unique-
ness’.
The above definition of theoretical uniqueness does not imply any state-
ment about the predictive power of the theoretically unique theory. This
reflects the fact, discussed in Section 5.3., that string theory at the present
stage does not offer a clear picture of its capability of predicting low energy
physics parameters. Depending on its final predictive power, string physics
may eventually fulfil one of the following two degrees of theoretical unique-
ness.
• Weak Theoretical Uniqueness denotes theoretical uniqueness that is
not connected to a unique pattern of low energy parameter values.
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• Extended Theoretical Uniqueness denotes the univocal determination
of all quantitative empirical data by the unique theoretical structure.
A theory that fulfils extended structural uniqueness still can not be ex-
pected to determine the local specifics of the spatio-temporal distribution
of physical objects. The prediction of local matter distribution from first
principles is traditionally considered to lie beyond the range of scientific the-
ories. Transgressing these limits would lead to a third kind of theoretical
uniqueness.
• Strong Theoretical Uniqueness applies if a hypothetical theoretically
unique scientific theory offers a unique prediction of matter distribu-
tion.
While there is nothing in today’s understanding of string physics that
would suggest strong theoretical uniqueness, the perspective that the lat-
ter concept might some day be applicable to physical theory building is less
farfetched than it appears at first sight. First, it must be noted that the
differences between fixing theoretical low energy parameter values and fixing
the distribution of specific individual objects get increasingly blurred in the
context of string cosmology. The D-branes whose positions and numbers are
presumed to play an important role in determining the parameter values of
the natural laws that guide physics at low energies are produced by the same
quantum oscillations in the early universe which are also responsible for the
universe’s matter distribution. A mechanism that uniquely determines all
local aspects of matter distribution thus would not have to be fundamentally
different from a mechanism that leaves just one choice for low energy param-
eter values. Extended and strong theoretical uniqueness might not be too far
apart. In addition, it is interesting to remember that one of the leading inter-
pretations of quantum physics, the Everett interpretation27, is based on the
notion that all possible outcomes of a quantum process are realised and form
a complex system of ‘many worlds’ that constitutes reality. If one applied
this concept to string cosmology, where matter distribution and low energy
parameter values stem from quantum oscillations in the early universe, this
would imply that all possible low energy parameter values as well as all possi-
ble matter distributions are instantiated in one of the many worlds and thus
must be taken to be real. Merging this understanding with the assumption
27[Eve73].
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that string theory is theoretically unique would indeed give the conception
of one unique material realisation of reality and therefore establish strong
theoretical uniqueness.28
The demise of scientific underdetermination and the ascend of theoret-
ical uniqueness clearly run counter to an antirealist stance. The faltering
of the pessimistic meta-induction removes one of the antirealist’s central ar-
guments against realism. Moreover, the general spirit of empiricism seems
hardly compatible with the concept of theoretical uniqueness. Empiricism
suggests a highly underdetermined scientific environment where useful the-
oretical instruments for describing the phenomena may be expected to be
constructible in fairly arbitrary numbers and kinds, in analogy to the free-
doms of building technical instruments for some practical purpose. This
understanding, which clearly is constitutive of instrumentalism, is shared, by
and large, also by constructive empiricism, whose arguments against realism
rely on a general assumption of underdetermination without addressing the
question of the latter’s limits.
At this point, string physics thus plainly seems to favour a position of
scientific realism. The next section will demonstrate, however, that things
are a little more involveed than that.
6 Duality versus Ontology
6.1 Ontology and Quantum Physics
For a short moment, it is necessary to return to the opening theme of this ar-
ticle, to quantum mechanics. A venerable tradition among philosophers and
philosophy-minded physicists, ranging from early exponents of the ‘Copen-
hagen Interpretation’ to Bernard d’Espagnat29, asserts the genuinely non-
realist quality of quantum mechanics. One important motive for anti-realism
with respect to quantum physics is the understanding that the irreducibly
statistical quality of statements in canonical quantum mechanics and the in-
determinist element of the quantum world contradict our intuitive notion of
a well ordered and well defined reality. Many philosophers would agree with
the assessment, though, that the present status of quantum physics leaves
28Note that the Everett interpretation on its own does not imply theoretical uniqueness
since it does not remove the freedom of theory choice.
29See e. g. [d’E89].
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enough room for avoiding anti-realist conclusions. Non-canonical interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics like the hidden parameter models of Bohm30
and Bell31 and the Everett interpretation offer deterministic and profoundly
realist interpretations of quantum physics. A canonical understanding of the
laws of quantum mechanics does not straightforwardly imply non-realism ei-
ther, but arguably allows for specific formulations of scientific realism.32 In
addition, it may well be expected that basic conceptions of quantum physics
will have to be altered to achieve a full integration of gravitational physics
into quantum physics33, which could offer entirely new perspectives on the
question of realism.
Still, there remains an irritating question for the scientific realist that
connects to the aforementioned general motive for antirealism in quantum
physics: if the intuitive quality of the external ontological object is diminished
piece by piece during the evolutionary progress of physical theory (which
must be acknowledged also in an Everettian or a hidden parameter frame-
work), is there any core of the notion of an ontological object at all that can
be trusted to be immune against scientific decomposition and therefore can
provide a promising foundation for realism?
Quantum mechanics cannot answer this question. Contemporary physics
is in a slightly different position because the erosion of the ontological ob-
ject has already proceeded much further. The dissolution of ontology that
starts in quantum mechanics gains momentum in gauge field theory until,
in string theory, the ontological object has simply vanished. The present
section will focus on the ‘(un)happy end’ of ontology’s demise and discuss
one specific feature of string theory, which constitutes the actual climax of
modern physics’ anti-ontological tendencies.
30[Boh52].
31[Bel87].
32For a canonical but still realist interpretation of quantum mechanics see e. g. [Red87]
and [Red95]. As an example of the decidedly realist spirit of many standard textbooks on
quantum mechanics, see [Mes69], chapter 4.4.1.
33Speculations about linking the contraction of the wave function to gravity were for ex-
ample formulated by R. Penrose. The question of the genuine non-objectivity of quantum
physics will not be addressed any further in this article. String theory so far has nothing
new to say about the contraction of the wave function.
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6.2 Ontology and String Dualities
The concept to be considered is string duality, which already played a role
in the previous chapter. As described in Section 2, T-duality implies that a
string wrapped around a small compact dimension can also be understood
as a string that is not wrapped but moves freely along a large compact
dimension. The phenomenon is rooted in the quantum principles but clearly
transcends what one is used to in the quantum world. It is not a mere case
of quantum indeterminacy concerning two states of the system. We rather
face two theoretical formulations which are undistinguishable in principle so
that they cannot be interpreted as referring to two different states at all.
Nevertheless, the two formulations differ in characteristics which lie at the
core of any meaningful ontology of an external world. They differ in the
shape of space-time and they differ in form and topological position of the
elementary objects.
T-duality is not the only duality relation encountered in string theory.
The existence of dualities turns out to be one of string theory’s most char-
acteristic features. Probably the most important role played by duality re-
lations today is to connect all different superstring theories. Before 1995,
physicists knew 5 different types of superstring theory. Then it turned out
that these 5 theories and a 6th by then unknown theory named ‘M-theory’
are interconnected by duality relations. Two types of duality are involved.
Some theories can be transformed into each other through the inversion of
a compactification radius, which is the phenomenon we know already un-
der the name of T-duality. Others can be transformed into each other by
inversion of the string coupling constant. This duality is called S-duality.
Then there is M-theory, where the string coupling constant is transformed
into an additional 11th dimension whose size is proportional to the coupling
strength of the dual theory. The described web of dualities connects theories
whose elementary objects have different symmetry structure and different
dimensionality. (As it turns out, each string theory needs a well-defined set
of higher dimensional D-branes to be consistent.) M-theory even has a differ-
ent number of spatial dimensions than its co-theories. Duality nevertheless
implies that M-theory and the 5 possible superstring theories only represent
different formulations of one single actual theory. This statement constitutes
the basis for string theory’s uniqueness claims and shows the pivotal role
played by the duality principle. In recent years, string-theoretical analysis
has discovered even more surprising duality relations. For example, there ex-
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ists a duality relation between certain theories that include gravitation and
certain pure gauge theories without gravitation in a space reduced by one
spatial dimension. More discoveries in this context might well follow in the
future.
The fact that different string theories with different elementary ontologies
are empirically equivalent constitutes an example of the Quinean kind of un-
derdetermination referred to in Section 5.2. Quine asserts that one can always
construct scientific theories which are empirically equivalent but logically in-
compatible. In order to delimit this claim from the trivial statement that
there are always different ways to tell the same story, Quine distinguishes
simple ‘reconstructions of predicates’ from ontologically different scientific
concepts. ‘Ontologically charged’ or reified objects are taken to be the essen-
tial elements of the theory, whose existence claims and observable properties
cannot be changed without creating a new theory. The simple renaming of
these objects that does not alter their properties (e.g. calling the electron
proton and vice versa) or the redefinition of parts of the theory that are not
reified (e.g. the change of coordinate systems) do not generate a new theory.
Quine’s ‘logically incompatible theories’ thus actually represent ‘ontologically
incompatible theories’. The corresponding kind of underdetermination thus
shall be called ‘ontological underdetermination’ from now on.
Ontological underdetermination, like scientific underdetermination, con-
stitutes a threat to scientific realism. If the totality of all possible empirical
data uniquely determines one ontology of microphysics, a scientific realist
interpretation of the corresponding theory would seem natural at least in
principle.34 If several or many possible ontological interpretations existed,
however, the scientific realist, who wants to establish her realist interpreta-
tion of microphysics based on abductive inference, would have to find good
arguments why she rejects one ontological interpretation and endorses an-
other. Ontological underdetermination cannot strictly refute realism, to be
sure. The metaphysical realist may insist that, even if the selection of one
set of ontological objects cannot be decided upon on empirical or rational
grounds, there is a true choice after all.35 It will turn out, however, that on-
tological underdetermination creates serious problems for the metaphysical
antirealist stance to remain coherent with basic conceptions of philosophy of
34The question whether the limited scientific theories available to us can identify this
real ontology still would remain to be answered, of course.
35Philosophers like Dummett actually define realism as a position that allows this kind
of statement [Dum91].
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science.
Theories related to each other by string dualities are by no means the first
examples of empirically equivalent ontologies in science. Two general types
of examples may be distinguished. First, one theoretical scheme can allow
various ontological interpretations. The phenomenon in this case is created
at a philosophical level by imputing an ontology to a physical theory whose
structure neither depends on nor predetermines uniquely that imputation.
The physicist puts one compact theoretical structure36 into space-time and
the philosopher struggles with the question at which level ontological claims
should be inserted. A prominent example of this situation is quantum field
theory where the status of elementary objects may be attributed either to
particles or to fields. Some philosophers have taken underdetermination at
this level as an argument against a realist basis for the imputation of ontolo-
gies. It might be suggested, however, that ontological alternatives at different
levels of the theoretical structure, even if they were equally viable, would not
pose a threat to realism per se but should be interpreted merely as different
possible parameterisations of one unique external reality.
Second, and resembling more closely the Quinean conception of ‘ontolog-
ical’ underdetermination, there can exist mathematically different scientific
schemes which are ontologically incompatible but describe the same obser-
vational world. Examples are the various empirically equivalent ways to
formulate a theory of gravitation. (see e.g. [LE03].)
String duality posits different ‘parallel’ empirically indistinguishable ver-
sions of structure in space-time which are based on different sets of elemen-
tary objects. These posits are placed at the physical level independently of
any philosophical interpretation and therefore fall into the second class of
ontological underdetermination. String theory differs from other examples
of that kind, however, since it interrelates the ontologically incompatible
but empirically equivalent physical descriptions within one overall scientific
theory.
A number of important problems which have marred previous exemplifi-
cations of ontological underdetermination are softened in the context of dual
string theories.
36To be sure, sometimes there do exist alternative ways to express a physical theory.
Quantum mechanics can be formulated in the Heisenberg- or the Schro¨dinger-picture and
quantum field theory in the field formalism or the path integral formalism. These al-
ternatives however are generally taken as alternative mathematical formulations without
differing ontological interpretations.
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First, there is the question how to distinguish reconstructions of pred-
icates from other empirically equivalent theories. Unfortunately, it is not
always clear which parts of a theory precisely should be reified. To give one
example, Poincare´’s reformulation of classical mechanics in infinite flat space
as a theory with altered physical laws in a finite space ([Poi02]) may look like
a genuinely new theory if one reifies infinite flat space. Still, the conception
is often understood as a mere reparameterisation of classical mechanics and
therefore as an example of a reconstruction of predicates.
Of course, the fundamental question whether it makes sense at all to
distinguish between reconstructions of predicates and empirically equivalent
but ontologically incompatible theories remains unchanged in the context
of string dualities. However, if one decides to introduce such a distinction
at all, dual string theories can be viewed as particularly clear examples of
incompatible ontologies. The dimensionality and the topological shape of
elementary objects seem to be essential characteristics of any meaningful
external ontology. To deny ontological quality to these characteristics would
mean withdrawing into an entirely abstract regime where an ontology cannot
any more be understood in terms of a characterisation of the external world.
The existence of dual theories thus proves particularly problematic for an
ontologically realist interpretation of scientific theories.
The case of string dualities is also better suited than other examples of
ontological underdetermination to deal with the problem of the preliminary
status of scientific theories. Quine asserts that the totality of all possible em-
pirical evidence underdetermines the choice of a scientific scheme. Attempts
to find scientific theories which can serve as examples of underdetermina-
tion usually fall short of exemplifying Quine’s assertion for a simple reason:
scientific theories in general cannot be expected to fit all possible empirical
evidence. The specific status of string theory changes this situation in two
respects. First, as has been discussed already in Section 5, string theory
offers a number of reasons for being called a final theory. Therefore, the as-
sertion that string theory, if fully understood, could fit all possible empirical
evidence, has a certain degree of plausibility. Second, in the context of string
theory the claim of ontological underdetermination is not based on the ac-
cidental occurrence of several empirically equivalent theoretical schemes but
on a physical principle, the principle of duality, which represents a deep char-
acteristic of the involved theories and may be expected to be a stable feature
of future fundamental physics. It seems plausible to assume that the duality
principle will continue to play an important role even if string theory changed
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substantially in the course of future research.
The occurrence of ontological underdetermination thus does not any more
look accidental but is made a core physical statement. This can be under-
stood as a genuinely physical argument against the assumption of one ‘real’
scientific ontology. The method of abductive reasoning, to which the sci-
entific realist wishes to resort, in this case suggests the abandonment of
ontological realism. The posit of one real ontology just does not seem to be
the best explanation of the observation that nature is characterised by the
existence of empirical equivalent but ontologically incompatible theoretical
descriptions. The die-hard metaphysical realist can resist this argument but,
by doing so, puts herself at variance with a core principle of scientific realism,
the principle of abduction.
There exists an additional aspect of string duality that strengthens the
anti-ontological message of string duality compared to other exemplifications
of ontological underdetermination. Duality does not just spell destruction
for the notion of the ontological scientific object but in a sense offers a re-
placement as well. By identifying theories with different sets of elementary
objects, it reduces the number of independent possible theories eventually
down to one. While the uniqueness of the elementary objects is lost, duality
thus provides a different quality of uniqueness, the theoretical uniqueness
that played the main role in the previous chapter. The significance of this
remarkable process will become transparent later on.
6.3 The Demise of Ontology
Do there remain any loop-holes in duality’s anti-realist implications? A nat-
ural objection to the asserted crucial philosophical importance of duality can
be based on the fact that duality was not invented in the context of string
theory. It is known since the times of P. M. Dirac that quantum electrody-
namics with magnetic monopoles would be dual to a theory with inverted
coupling constant and exchanged electric and magnetic charges. The ques-
tion arises, if duality is poison to ontological realism, why didn’t it have its
effect already at the level of quantum electrodynamics. The answer gives a
nice survey of possible measures to save ontological realism. As it will turn
out, they all fail in string theory.
In the case of quantum-electrodynamics, the realist has several arguments
to counter the duality threat. First, duality looks more like an accidental
oddity that appears in an unrealistic theoretical scenario than like a char-
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acteristic feature of the world. No one has observed magnetic monopoles,
which renders the problem hypothetical. And even if there were magnetic
monopoles, an embedding of electromagnetism into a fuller description of the
natural forces would destroy the dual structure anyway.
As discussed already, the situation is very different in string theory. Du-
ality is no ‘lucky strike’ any more, which just by chance arises in one spe-
cific scenario. It rather represents a core feature of the emerging theoretical
structure and cannot be ignored. Due to the described termination of new
phenomena below the string scale it cannot be expected either that new
phenomena will arise which could destroy the duality relations.
A second option open to the realist at the level of quantum electrody-
namics is to shift the ontological posit. As it was alluded to above, some
philosophers of quantum physics argue that the natural elementary object of
quantum field theory is the quantum field, which represents something like
the potentiality to produce elementary particles. One quantum field covers
the full sum over all variations of particle exchange which have to be ac-
counted for in a quantum process. The philosopher who posits the quantum
field to be the fundamental real object discovered by quantum field theory
understands the single elementary particles as mere mathematical entities
introduced to calculate the behaviour of the quantum field. Dual theories
from this perspective can be taken as different technical procedures to cal-
culate the behaviour of the univocal ontological object, the electromagnetic
quantum field. The phenomenon of duality then does not appear as a threat
to the ontological concept per se but merely as an indication in favour of an
ontologisation of the field instead of the particle.
The field theoretical approach to interpret the quantum field as the on-
tological object does not have any pendent in string theory. String theory
only exists as a perturbative theory. There seems to be no way of intro-
ducing anything like a quantum field that would cover the full expansion
of string exchanges. In the light of duality, this lack of a unique ontologi-
cal object arguably looks rather natural. The reason for that is related to
another point that makes string dualities more dramatic than its field theo-
retical predecessor. String theory includes gravitation. Therefore, object (the
1+1-dimensional string “world-sheet”) and space-time are not independent.
Actually, it turns out that the string world-sheet geometry in a way carries
all information about space-time as well. This dependence of space-time on
string-geometry makes it difficult already to imagine how it should be possi-
ble to put into this very space-time some kind of overall field whose coverage
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of all string realisations actually implies coverage of variations of space-time
itself. The duality context makes the paradoxical quality of such an attempt
more transparent. If two dual theories with different radii of a compactified
dimension are to be covered by the same ontological object in analogy to
the quantum field in field theory, this object obviously cannot live in space
and time. If it would, it had to choose one of the two space-time versions
endorsed by the dual theories, thereby discriminating the other one. It might
well happen that at some time string theorists will find a more fundamental
theoretical basis for string theory that is unique and non-perturbative and
from which all 6 theories known today can be derived. This theory, however,
should not be expected to be a theory of objects in space-time and therefore
does not raise any hopes of redeeming the external ontological perspective.
A third strategy to save ontological realism is based on the following
argument: In quantum electrodynamics the difference between the dual the-
ories boils down to a mere replacement of a weak coupling constant which
allows perturbative calculation by a strong one which does not. Therefore,
the physicist faces the choice between a natural formulation and a clumsy
untreatable one which maybe should just be discarded as an artificial con-
struction.
Today, string theory cannot tell whether its final solutions – given they
exist - put its parameters comfortably into the low-coupling-constant-and-
large-compact-dimension-regime of one of the 5 superstring theories or M-
theory. This might be the case but it might as well happen that solutions
lie in a region of parameter space where no theory clearly stands out in this
sense. However, even if there were one preferred theory, the simple discard-
ing of the others could not save realism as in the case of field theory. First,
the argument of natural choice is not really applicable to T-duality. A small
compactification radius does not render a theory intractable like a large cou-
pling constant. The choice of the dual version with a large radius thus rather
looks like an arbitrary convention. Second, the choice of both compactifica-
tion radii and string coupling constants in string theory is the consequence of
a dynamical process that has to be calculated itself. Calculation thus stands
before the selection of a certain point in parameter space and consequently
also before a possible selection of the ontological objects. The ontological
objects therefore, even if one wanted to hang on to their meaningfulness in
the final scenario, would appear as a mere product of prior dynamics and
not as a priori actors in the game.
Summing up, the phenomenon of duality is admittedly a bit irritating
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for the ontological realist in field theory but she can live with it.37 In string
theory however, the field theoretical strategies to save realism all fail. The
position assumed by the duality principle in string theory clearly renders
obsolete the traditional realist understanding of scientific objects as smaller
cousins of visible ones. The theoretical posits of string theory get their mean-
ing only relative to their theoretical framework and must be understood as
mathematical concepts without any claim to ‘corporal’ existence in an exter-
nal world. The world of string theory has cut all ties with classical theories
about physical bodies. To stick to ontological realism in this altered context,
would be inadequate to the elementary changes which characterise the new
situation. String theory simply is no theory about invisible external objects.
7 Consistent Structure Realism
Three distinct statements about string theory’s impact on the scientific re-
alism debate have evolved in the previous sections and now await to be put
into context. First, the increasing disproportion between the richness of the
theoretical structure in modern physical theories and the minimalism of their
directly visible effects renders an empiricist stance highly implausible. Sec-
ond and fully in line with the realist tendency of the first point, string theory
gives rise to a principle of theoretical uniqueness that is at variance with the
conceptual basis of empiricism. Third, however, the philosophical doubts
of scientific non-realists about the stability of the ontological basis of scien-
tific realism are maximally confirmed by string theory. The notion of the
external ontological object evaporates in the presence of strings. A joint re-
sume of all three statements conveys a clear message: neither the established
brands of scientific anti-realism nor the conventional ontological formulation
of scientific realism are compatible with spirit and content of string physics.
String theory thus suggests a middle position in the realism debate, which
establishes the objective status of a final scientific theory without ontological
connotations. The cogency of this suggestion is enhanced by the fact that
the realist and antirealist tendencies of string physics find their sharpest ex-
pression based on the same physical concept: the concept of string duality.
By reducing the five seemingly independent models of superstrings to dif-
37From a string theoretical perspective, Dirac’s electromagnetic duality of course fore-
shadows the upcoming situation and represents a good example how what fully emerges
in string theory has its roots in prior physical concepts.
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ferent formulations of the same theoretical scheme, string dualities lay the
ground for theoretical uniqueness but concurrently deliver the lethal blow
to ontological realism. An intermediate position between ontological realism
and empiricism thus appears as an immediate consequence of the theoretical
structure of string physics.
Moreover, the string-induced arguments pro and contra realism are re-
lated to the markedly different fates of two distinct versions of one basic
philosophical principle: the principle of underdetermination. While ontolog-
ical underdetermination assumes a central position in string physics, scientific
underdetermination loses its former position. Couched in terms of the con-
cept of uniqueness, the statement may be made more precise: ontological
uniqueness, the notion that the theoretical scheme comprises one uniquely
identifiable set of elementary ontological objects in space and time, must be
abandoned, but uniqueness reappears in the new form of theoretical unique-
ness, the notion that the basic layout of our observational world allows only
one universal scientific theory (modulo what Quine calls ‘reconstructions of
predicates’) at a fundamental level.
Given that the uniqueness of the real constitutes a core element of any
realist conception, it is plausible to interpret the transfer of uniqueness as an
indication of a transformation from an ontological towards a structural form
of realism. It is instructive to make one step backwards and distinguish two
steps of a transfer of the quality of uniqueness which both can contribute to
a structural realist understanding. First, the realist posit simply must recede
from an ontological to a structural level because the uniqueness claims recede
the same way. While no unique ontology of objects in space and time can be
imputed any more, there still remains the fact that the various empirically
equivalent ontological sets are all covered by one overall theoretical scheme.
Thus, at a higher level of abstraction at which a scientific theory cannot any-
more be conceived of in terms of putting a specific structure into spacetime, a
unique structure can be identified and understood in realist terms. This may
be taken to be sufficient for positing some kind of structural realism. The
highly abstract level at which structural reality is placed may be considered
to be a problematic foundation for an intuitively satisfactory form of realism,
however, if no other arguments support a realist conception.
Theoretical uniqueness obviously goes far beyond the uniqueness argu-
ment deployed in the last paragraph and thereby adds an important new
element to a structural understanding of realism. In a conventional scientific
setting that does not imply theoretical uniqueness, one must at each stage of
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the scientific process expect the possibility of theories which are compatible
with the available empirical data but differ from the one specific theory that
is realised in the actual world. Two problems therefore arise. On the one
hand, it remains unclear how the currently chosen scientific structures can be
related to the real structure in a way that goes beyond the strictly empiricist
point that the two are observationally undistinguishable up to a certain level
of experimental precision.38 On the other hand, it seems difficult to pinpoint
in what sense the empirically adequate structure acquires reality. The latter
problem becomes more troublesome in a scenario where, as discussed above,
the real structure cannot be put into space and time.
If the physical description is theoretically unique, however, consistency in
connection with the correctness of the deployed basic preconceptions about
the characteristics of a scientific theory turns into a sufficient condition for
the real existence of fundamental structure. Once there remains only one
universal consistent scientific scheme, from that point onwards exhaustive
knowledge about the real theoretical structure can not only be acquired by
empirical testing but also by pure theorizing. Thus, both questions posed
above can find a more satisfactory answer. First, there is a clear way in
which the present scientific theories are related to real structure. The real
structure is the only possible universal and fully consistent improvement
of the limited or not fully developed theoretical structures available today.
Current scientific theories thus approach structural reality by extending their
own consistent regime. Second, by acquiring a significant degree of epistemic
independence from phenomenology, structure assumes a role that goes far
beyond what would be acceptable from an empiricist point of view, which
justifies a realist interpretation.
In order to use the concept of theoretical uniqueness as a foundational
element of a structural kind of realism, the notion that string physics sug-
gests theoretical uniqueness must be turned into the philosophical posit that
theoretical uniqueness constitutes an essential quality of our world. Real
38This problem was discussed e.g. in [Psi99] in the context of structural realism. Since
not all aspects of structure are fully transferred from one scientific theory to its successor
theory (if so, that would imply the empirical equivalence of the two theories), structural
realism must be based on the qualified claim that the structures of present scientific
theories can be expected to be similar to the real structure. Based on this similarity
claim, the present theories’ structural statements may be expected to be approximately
true. It is difficult, however, to pin down in which way the similarity between structures
can be defined.
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structure then can be taken to be defined by the fact that it constitutes the
unique consistent universal scientific structure. A position along these lines
shall be called ‘consistent structure realism’.
Consistent structure realism clearly is related to the kinds of structural
realism proposed by Worrall39 and Ladyman40 based on quite different lines
of argument. Worrall argues for structural realism by reassessing the validity
of the pessimistic meta-induction. The latter, he claims, successfully under-
mines the long-term stability of ontological objects but does not offer reasons
for doubting the stability of the fundamental structural characteristics of sci-
entific theories (which, according to Worrall, mostly survive theory change).
Worrall therefore suggests that structural reality is all that can be grasped
by scientific inquiry - though not necessarily all there is. Ladyman ques-
tioned the coherence of Worrall’s epistemological form of structural realism
and suggested an ontic version instead that denies reality beyond structure.
The string-theory-based arguments which suggest consistent structure real-
ism obviously do not rely on the pessimistic meta-induction, which, according
to Section 5, loses most of its significance. Instead, they crucially rely on the
demise of ontological uniqueness. While a lack of ontological uniqueness at
face value is compatible with the metaphysical posit of ontological reality, it
has been argued in Section 6 that core elements of the conception of scien-
tific realism would be at variance with such a posit. In the context of the
scientific realism debate, structural implications of string physics thus should
work at an ontological rather than at an epistemological level and suggest
an ontic form of structural realism. Still, consistent structure realism differs
from Ladyman’s ontic structural realism in its reliance on purely theoretical
epistemic access to structural reality.
Because of the latter, consistent structure realism can be more timid than
structural realism with respect to the question of the approximate truth of
current scientific statements. Since a theory’s closeness to true structure can
be gauged by its closeness to the fully universal and consistent theoretical
scheme, consistent structure realism can provide a meaningful notion of real-
ism without relying on claims about the truth or approximate truth of current
scientific theories. For the consistent structure realist, the unique consistent
structure constitutes a crucial but somewhat remote aspect of reality. Any
discovery of new theoretical interconnections necessitated by consistency ar-
39[Wor89]
40[Lad98]
39
guments produces new logically true statements, thereby contributes to a
better understanding of the character of the true structure and thus reveals
something about reality. In case of a fully universal theory like string the-
ory, the true theory is approached by acquiring a better and more complete
understanding of the theory in question. At earlier stages of theory develop-
ment, where fundamental theories have a limited scope, truth is approached
by extending the theories’ scope. Of course, modern theories in fundamental
physics can get and must be hoped to get important input from phenomenol-
ogy in the form of experimental checks of the scientific statements based on
consistency arguments. But phenomenology is not what modern fundamen-
tal physical theories are about. It is a long way from the lines on a picture
in a particle scattering experiment to the structures of the Standard Model
and a longer way still from the falling apple to superstrings. The consistency
arguments which lead this way univocally are the true discoveries of modern
physics and they represent the microphysical reality that is being described.
Up to this point, consistent structure realism has been developed based
on the weak form of theoretical uniqueness. The uniqueness of structure has
been exploited without any reference to empirical prediction. The concep-
tual power of consistent structure realism might be significantly enhanced,
though, if it were based on extended or strong theoretical uniqueness. It
may be of interest to spend a few thoughts on these scenarios in order to
assess the more far-reaching perspectives opened up by the presented kind
of analysis.
Extended theoretical uniqueness provides scientific theoretical analysis
with the capacity to determine and predict phenomenological regularities
uniquely from a certain stage onwards. While weak theoretical uniqueness
implied epistemic independence of real structure from phenomenology, its
extension thus attributes to real structure the unique observable realisation
of phenomenological laws. It is not quite clear whether this step can be taken
to add substantial strength to the concept of consistent structure realism. On
the one hand, it might seem that realism based on unique consistent structure
gains plausibility if uniqueness extends to the regime of observable physical
objects at some level, since only that step can provide an understanding
how consistent structure realism connects to intuitive notions of realism. On
the other hand, one might argue that not much is won besides deceptive
intuitiveness, since the difference between local and global characteristics
of the world loses its fundamental character in string theory and modern
cosmology (see Section 5). At a fundamental level, the step towards extended
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uniqueness thus does not seem to change the character of consistent structure
realism.
Strong theoretical uniqueness would constitute a far more fundamental
change. It would imply the unique determination of the global and local
realization of the world based on theoretical arguments. No room would
be left for potentiality once the basic preconceptions about scientific theory
building and some qualitative phenomenological information about our world
were taken for granted. On that basis, then, reality could be identified with
internal consistency, which would offer an interesting new foundation for
the concept of realism. If modality were fully dissolved, the question of
pinpointing reality would become a mere question of consistency. In the
analysed case, modality is not dissolved entirely but has receded dramatically
to the acceptance of basic preconceptions and observations. Reality then
becomes a question of consistency on the basis of a core of observational
data and the validity of the basic preconceptions. The grasp of the notion of
structural reality can be improved by analysing and specifying the amount
of empirical data and the character of basic preconceptions necessary for
reaching the regime of theoretical uniqueness. The farther both of these can
be rolled back, the stronger a realist position can become.
It is clear that even under the condition of strong theoretical uniqueness
theoretical structure remains dependent on phenomenology. As mentioned
above, the physical principles which lay the foundations for the evolution of
theory building are still rooted in observation. Without a certain amount
of observational data about the world none of the physical consistency ar-
guments could get off the ground. In addition, scientific theories still are
theories about observables. They predict observable properties and their
uniqueness must be understood with respect to their observational predic-
tions. On the other hand, the specific realisation of the observational world
in a strongly theoretically unique scenario appears like a secondary aspect of
consistency arguments. Thus emerges an intricate compound of mutual de-
pendence between observational and structural aspects of reality whose full
disentangling lies beyond the scope of the present article.
In conclusion, string physics seems to suggest a position in the scientific
realism debate that may be called realist for a number of reasons but differs
from classical realist positions in several respects. In the light of what has
been said in Section 3, this assessment can be set against the background
of genuinely philosophical reasoning that indicates the importance of the
search for intermediate positions between classical realism and empiricism.
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The messages from string physics thus coincide remarkably well with internal
needs of the scientific realism debate and could show crucial aspects of that
debate in a new light. Physical arguments therefore might turn out to be
truly helpful in providing new answers to old philosophical problems. On the
other hand, philosophy gains new importance for fundamental physics as well.
Section 5.4 has alluded to the point that a new philosophical perspective may
become necessary to acquire an appropriate understanding of the relevance
and status of string theory as a physical theory. We witness strong signs for a
novel fertile interdependence between contemporary fundamental physics and
philosophy of science. At a time when both fields feel the need to transcend
the traditional frameworks their rapprochement comes at hands.
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